Books

Title Information

Title
Antitrust Law - An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
Author(s) / Editor(s)
Phillip E. Areeda, Late Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard University
Herbert Hovenkamp, Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa
Publication Date
1978
Last updated
Supplement 2012, 2012
ISBN
0-7355-6079-X
Publisher
Aspen Publishers
Antitrust Law - An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Areeda and Hovenkamp (1978)

  pp. xix-xx

        Preface
      
  pp. xxiii-xxxii

        Introduction
      
  pp. -
Part One: Preliminary and Pervasive Issues: Antitrust Goals, Coverage, Procedure, and Economics
      
pp. 3-143
Chapter 1 The Objectives of Antitrust Law
          
pp. 3-7

                100. Appropriate and Inappropriate Antitrust Objectives 
              
pp. 8-97
1A Economic Concerns Dominate Historical Development of Competition Policy
              
pp. 8-11

                    101. Legal, Political, and Economic Background of Sherman Act: General Conclusions 
                  
pp. 11-41

                    102. Earliest "Anti-Trust" Policy in State Corporate Law 
                  
pp. 41-63

                    103. The Sherman Act: Intent of the Framers 
                  
pp. 63-97

                    104. The Common Law, Economics, and the Evolution of Antitrust 
                  
pp. 98-143
1B Economic Concerns Trump Inconsistent Policy Concerns
              
pp. 98-100

                    110. Governing Principles Summarized 
                  
pp. 100-119

                    111. Noneconomic Antitrust Goals Incoherent and Indefensible 
                  
pp. 120-140

                    112. Exclusively Economic Approach Coherent but Imperfect 
                  
pp. 140-143

                    113. Economics Limits Role of Intent 
                  
pp. -
Chapter 2 The Domain of the Antitrust Laws: Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Exclusions from Coverage
          
pp. 146-151

                200. Regulatory Immunities and Exemptions; General Principle Stated 
              
pp. 151-221
2A "Political Action" and Petitions to the Government
              
pp. 151-160

                    201. Introduction and Summary; Noerr and Pennington Decisions 
                  
pp. 161-171

                    202. Anticompetitive Purpose and Burden on Rivals or Rivalry Not Intrinsically Wrongful; Causation 
                  
pp. 171-221

                    203. Influencing Government Action by Improper, Deceitful, or Unnecessarily Harmful Means 
                  
pp. 221-305
2A-1 "Sham" Petitioning
                  
pp. 221-239

                        204. "Sham" or Bad Faith Action 
                      
pp. 239-286

                        205. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Petitions: "Sham" and False Claims 
                      
pp. 286-292

                        206. Requests for Government Actions That Are Unconstitutional, Unauthorized, or Otherwise Improper 
                      
pp. 292-301

                        207. Pleading and Proving Sham 
                      
pp. 301-305

                        208. Sham as Antitrust Violation 
                      
pp. 305-337
2A-2 Non-Immunity Outside of "Sham"; Collateral Issues
                  
pp. 305-316

                        209. "Commercial Exception": Government as Buyer, Seller, Lessor, Lessee, Franchisor 
                      
pp. 316-323

                        210. Compulsory Filings with Government Agencies 
                      
pp. 323-332

                        211. Petitions to Nongovernmental Bodies 
                      
pp. 332-337

                        212. Evidentiary Use of Protected Activities; Discovery of "Sham" Litigation Documents 
                      
pp. 337-376
2B Antitrust in a Federal System: Relationship with State Regulation
              
pp. 337-343

                    215. Introduction; Collateral Concerns of Federalism 
                  
pp. 343-376
2B-1 General Interplay of State Law and Federal Antitrust Law
                  
pp. 343-351

                        216. Concurrent Authority: Overlapping State and Federal Antitrust Laws 
                      
pp. 351-376

                        217. Concerns for Competition and Federal Preemption of State or Local Regulation 
                      
pp. 11-13

                        217.1 Preemption of Price-Posting Statutes Under Supreme Court's Leegin Decision 
                      
pp. 3-41
2B-2 Areas of Federally Created Express Primacy for State Law

pp. 3-3

                        218. Express Federal Deference Generally 
                      
pp. 4-31

                        219. Federal Antitrust Immunity for the "Business of Insurance" 
                      
pp. 31-41

                        220. Insurance Immunity: "Boycott" Exception 
                      
pp. 42-249
2B-3 Implied Antitrust Immunity For “State Action”
                  
pp. 42-71

                        221. Introduction: the Meaning of Parker v. Brown 
                      
pp. 71-79

                        222. Scope of Parker Immunity Outlined; Summary Disposition of Parker Claims 
                      
pp. 79-93

                        223. Antitrust Liability for Governmental Subdivisions; Corrective Legislation 
                      
pp. 93-131

                        224. State Authorization to Displace Antitrust Law 
                      
pp. 131-163

                        225. Ambiguities in Authorizing Provision 
                      
pp. 163-196

                        226. Active Supervision Requirement: Domain and Nature 
                      
pp. 197-209

                        227. The Need for Supervision: Identifying and Classifying the Relevant Actor 
                      
pp. 209-227

                        228. Non-Immunity But No Antitrust Violation or Penalty 
                      
pp. 227-234

                        229. Relationship of Noerr and Parker Immunities 
                      
pp. 234-243

                        230. Possible Alternative Criteria for Parker Immunity 
                      
pp. 243-249

                        231. The "State Action" Doctrine in the Federal Trade Commission 
                      
pp. 249-426
2B-4 Non-Antitrust Limitations on Anticompetitive State Activities
                  
pp. 249-260

                        232. Miscellaneous Federal Limitations 
                      
pp. 260-272

                        233. Commerce Clause 
                      
pp. -
2C Antitrust Policy Under Federal Regulation and Deregulation
              
pp. 272-426
2C-1 Federal Regulation Generally
                  
pp. 272-289

                        240. Federal Regulation Qualifies Antitrust Mandate 
                      
pp. 290-307

                        241. Deregulation Revises and Expands Antitrust Mandate 
                      
pp. 307-312

                        242. Relationship Between Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Regime; General Conclusions Summarized 
                      
pp. 312-364

                        243. When Does Regulation Oust Federal Antitrust Authority? 
                      
pp. 365-396

                        244. Judicial Deferral to Agency Decision Making 
                      
pp. 396-405

                        245. Antitrust Deference to Nonfederal Tribunal or Decision Maker 
                      
pp. 405-409

                        246. Good Faith Regulatory Compliance as Defense to Non-Immune Conduct 
                      
pp. 410-423

                        247. The "Filed Rate" Doctrine and Its Limitations 
                      
pp. 424-426

                        248. Noerr, Parker, and Federal Regulatory Immunities Compared 
                      
pp. 3-69
2C-2 Particular Federal Exemptions
                  
pp. 4-19

                        249. Agricultural Cooperatives and Related Producer Organizing 
                      
pp. 19-25

                        250. Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
                      
pp. 25-62

                        251. Other Miscellaneous Exemptions 
                      
pp. 62-69

                        252. National Sovereign Immunity 
                      
pp. 70-157
2C-3 Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy
                  
pp. 70-95

                        255. Basic Antitrust Immunity for Labor Organizing 
                      
pp. 95-130

                        256. "Non-Statutory Exemption" - Restraints Implicating Employers or Other Nonlabor Groups 
                      
pp. 130-157

                        257. Multi-Employer Bargaining, Employer Restraints, and Brown Decision 
                      
pp. 158-199
2D Noncommercial Entities and Activities
              
pp. 158-165

                    260. Introduction; Antitrust's Purpose to Regulate "Commerce" 
                  
pp. 165-176

                    261. Nonprofit Organizations Generally Not Immune 
                  
pp. 176-199

                    262. Noncommercial Activities Generally Immune 
                  
pp. 199-254
2E The Jurisdictional Reach of the Antitrust Laws: Interstate Commerce
              
pp. 199-201

                    265. Interstate Commerce: The General Requirement 
                  
pp. 201-239

                    266. Sherman Act Reach Broad But Not Infinite 
                  
pp. 239-254

                    267. The "In Commerce" Provisions 
                  
pp. 255-385
2F The Jurisdictional Reach of the Antitrust Laws: Foreign Commerce
              
pp. 255-256

                    270. Introduction 
                  
pp. 257-273

                    271. Judicial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Suits Against Nondomestic Actors 
                  
pp. 274-326

                    272. Extraterritorial Reach: "Effects" Test and Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 
                  
pp. 326-359

                    273. Appraising Restraints Abroad; Comity with Foreign Nations 
                  
pp. 359-379

                    274. Foreign Government Involvement 
                  
pp. 379-383

                    275. Antitrust Remedies in Foreign Commerce 
                  
pp. 383-385

                    276. National Adjudication versus Diplomacy 
                  
pp. 3-446
Chapter 3 The Antitrust System of Remedies
          
pp. 3-4

                300. Introduction 
              
pp. 5-59
3A Statutory Structure; Relationship of Provisions
              
pp. 5-12

                    301. The Relationship of the Antitrust Laws to the Common Law and to One Another 
                  
pp. 13-35

                    302. The Federal Trade Commission Act and the FTC 
                  
pp. 36-59

                    303. Relationship of Sanctions and Liability 
                  
pp. 60-226
3B Rule Determination in the Litigation Process
              
pp. 60-71

                    305. Per Se Rules, Presumptions, and Stare Decisis 
                  
pp. 71-83

                    306. Jury Trial 
                  
pp. 83-126

                    307. The Antitrust Complaint; Prediscovery Summary Disposition; Sanctions 
                  
pp. 127-155

                    308. Summary Judgment 
                  
pp. 155-197

                    309. Judicial Control of Expert Testimony 
                  
pp. 197-210

                    310. Aggregation of Claims Greater than Sum of Parts? Continental Ore 
                  
pp. 210-226

                    311. Simplifying Antitrust Litigation; Alternative Dispute Resolution 
                  
pp. 226-231
3C Repose in Antitrust Litigation
              
pp. 226-231

                    315. Guidelines, Clearances, and Advisory Opinions 
                  
pp. 3-37
3D Equitable Relief
              
pp. 3-19

                    325. Nature, Objectives, and Scope 
                  
pp. 19-25

                    326. Private Suits in Equity 
                  
pp. 25-37

                    327. Consent Decrees 
                  
pp. 37-61
3E Private Antitrust Actions Generally
              
pp. 37-47

                    330. Statutory Scheme 
                  
pp. 47-48

                    331. Class Actions: A Brief Introduction 
                  
pp. 48-61

                    331a. Utility and general requisites. 
                  
pp. 61-315
3F "Standing" of Private Plaintiffs
              
pp. 61-155
3F-1 General Standing Doctrine
                  
pp. 61-80

                        335. "Standing" 
                      
pp. 80-82

                        336. "Business or Property" 
                      
pp. 82-96

                        337. "Antitrust Injury" 
                      
pp. 97-108

                        338. Causation and Injury-in-Fact 
                      
pp. 108-125

                        339. Remote, Derivative, Duplicative, or Inferior Plaintiff 
                      
pp. 125-155

                        340. Reasonably Ascertainable Damages 
                      
pp. 156-315
3F-2 Recurring "Standing" Situations
                  
pp. 156-160

                        345. Consumers and Other Buyers 
                      
pp. 160-198

                        346. Indirect Purchasers 
                      
pp. 198-201

                        347. "Umbrella" Transactions 
                      
pp. 201-225

                        348. Competitor Suits 
                      
pp. 225-233

                        349. Nascent Firms 
                      
pp. 233-248

                        350. Suppliers 
                      
pp. 248-352

                        351. Licensors and Landlords 
                      
pp. 352-261

                        352. Employees 
                      
pp. 262-258

                        353. Taxpayers (or Citizens), Creditors, or Shareholders 
                      
pp. 268-272

                        354. Associations 
                      
pp. 272-275

                        355. Governments 
                      
pp. 275-283

                        356. Special Problems of Private Merger Suits 
                      
pp. 284-291

                        357. Intrabrand Distribution Restraints 
                      
pp. 291-296

                        358. Challenges to Tying and Exclusive Dealing 
                      
pp. 296-298

                        359. Robinson-Patman Act Violations 
                      
pp. 298-299

                        360. Defenses and Declaratory Judgments 
                      
pp. 300-306

                        361. Plaintiff's Own Improper Conduct Barring Antitrust Prosecution 
                      
pp. 307-315

                        362. Assignment of Antitrust Claims; Indirect Purchaser Issues 
                      
pp. 315-315

                        363. Harm to Competition Under Packers and Stockyards Act 
                      
pp. 315-446
3G The Economics of Impact, Antitrust Injury, and Antitrust Damages
              
pp. 315-318

                    390. Introduction 
                  
pp. 318-331

                    391. Antitrust Injury and Economic Analysis 
                  
pp. 331-344

                    392. Evidentiary Standards 
                  
pp. 344-353

                    393. Timing, Interest, Present Values 
                  
pp. 354-376

                    394. Econometrics and Statistical Inference 
                  
pp. 376-406

                    395. Damages in Overcharge Cases 
                  
pp. 406-417

                    396. Damages for Indirect Purchasers 
                  
pp. 417-437

                    397. Damages for Exclusionary Practices 
                  
pp. 437-443

                    398. Economic Issues in Class Certification 
                  
pp. 443-446

                    399. Daubert and the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
                  
pp. 3-104
Chapter 4 The Economic Basis for Antitrust Policy
          
pp. 3-3

                400. Introduction 
              
pp. 3-31
4A The Basic Economics of Competition, Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Cartels
              
pp. 3-4

                    401. The Rationale of Antitrust Policy 
                  
pp. 4-7

                    402. The Nature and Economic Consequences of a Perfectly Competitive Economy 
                  
pp. 7-9

                    403. The Nature and Economic Consequences of Monopoly 
                  
pp. 9-28

                    404. Oligopoly: Nature, Economic Consequences, and Measurement 
                  
pp. 28-31

                    405. Cartels 
                  
pp. 31-71
4B Departures from the Competitive Model: Implications for Antitrust Policy
              
pp. 31-34

                    406. Essential Points 
                  
pp. 34-42

                    407. Progressiveness - Accounting for Innovation 
                  
pp. 42-58

                    408. Economies of Scale and Antitrust Policy 
                  
pp. 58-60

                    409. Product Differentiation: Monopolistic Competition 
                  
pp. 60-61

                    410. Information Asymmetry 
                  
pp. 61-62

                    411. Agency and Free Rider Problems 
                  
pp. 62-66

                    412. "Second Best" Problems 
                  
pp. 66-68

                    413. Resource Immobility: "Ruinous" Competition 
                  
pp. 68-71

                    414. Externalities; Transaction Costs 
                  
pp. 71-104
4C Barriers to Entry: Meaning, Identification, and Antitrust Policy Consequences
              
pp. 71-79

                    420. Entry Barriers Generally 
                  
pp. 79-91

                    421. Sources of Entry Barriers 
                  
pp. 91-101

                    422. Assessing Likelihood and Effectiveness of Entry; Government Guidelines 
                  
pp. 101-104

                    423. Potential Competition and Market Definition 
                  
  pp. -
Part Two: Market Structure Issues
      
pp. 101-445
Chapter 5 Market Power and Market Definition
          
pp. 107-109

                500. Introduction and Preview 
              
pp. 109-224
5A Defining Market Power
              
pp. 109-111

                    501. Market Power Defined 
                  
pp. 111-115

                    502. The Social Cost of Market Power 
                  
pp. 115-120

                    503. Formal Price-Cost Measure of Market Power: The Theory 
                  
pp. 120-124

                    504. Formal Price-Cost Measure of Market Power: Difficulties 
                  
pp. 124-125

                    505. Complex and Changing Power 
                  
pp. 125-128

                    506. Buyer Response and Substitutes Check Market Power 
                  
pp. 128-133

                    507. Economic Relationship Among Market Power, Elasticity of Demand, and Elasticity of Supply 
                  
pp. 133-135

                    508. "Unexercised" Market Power 
                  
pp. 135-224
5B "Alternative," Non-Market-based Proofs of Market Power
              
pp. 135-136

                    515. Introduction: Market Definition and Alternatives 
                  
pp. 136-150

                    516. Inferring Power from Excess Returns or Accounting Data 
                  
pp. 150-161

                    517. Price Discrimination and Market Power 
                  
pp. 161-178

                    518. Intellectual Property as Proof of Market Power 
                  
pp. 189-205

                    519. Post-Contract Power: Contract Lock-in Does Not Create Power for Antitrust Purposes 
                  
pp. 205-213

                    520. Conduct Indicating Market Power 
                  
pp. 213-224

                    521. Direct Estimates of Market Power from Computation of Residual Demand Curves 
                  
pp. 224-224

                    522. Concluding Comment 
                  
pp. 224-307
5C Market Definition - General Considerations
              
pp. 224-232

                    530. Introduction and Preview 
                  
pp. 232-242

                    531. Legal Functions of Market Definition; Pleading Requirements 
                  
pp. 242-251

                    532. Meaning of Market Shares; Relation to Market Definition 
                  
pp. 251-263

                    533. "Submarket" Confusion 
                  
pp. 263-273

                    534. Delineating Markets from Price Relationships, Purchasing Patterns, or Price Discrimination 
                  
pp. 273-284

                    535. Measuring Share Within a Given Market 
                  
pp. 284-289

                    536. Hypothetical Price Increase Methodology to Define Market 
                  
pp. 289-294

                    537. "Significant" Price Increase Required and Defined 
                  
pp. 294-299

                    538. Predicting Effects of Hypothetical Price Increase 
                  
pp. 299-307

                    539. The Cellophane Fallacy: Misleading Elasticities at Current Prices 
                  
pp. 307-355
5D Geographic Markets
              
pp. 308-320

                    550. Geographic Market: Price Relationships and Trading Patterns 
                  
pp. 320-325

                    551. Economics of Geographic Markets 
                  
pp. 325-341

                    552. Geographic Market: Transport Costs 
                  
pp. 341-347

                    553. Geographic Market: Customer Convenience and Preference 
                  
pp. 347-349

                    554. Geographic Markets: Government Guidelines 
                  
pp. 349-355

                    555. Geographic Market: Foreign Competition 
                  
pp. 355-357

                    556. Geographic Market Definition: Effect of Private Restraints on Dealer Location, Shipment, or Sales 
                  
pp. 357-417
5E Product Markets
              
pp. 357-360

                    560. Introduction 
                  
pp. 360-369

                    561. Product Market: Producer Substitutes 
                  
pp. 369-383

                    562. Product Market: User Substitutes 
                  
pp. 383-394

                    563. Differentiated Products; Markets and Brands 
                  
pp. 394-404

                    564. Derivative Markets, Aftermarkets, and Lock-in Problems 
                  
pp. 404-413

                    565. Distinguishing Substitutes from Complements; Cluster Markets 
                  
pp. 413-417

                    566. Distribution Modes 
                  
pp. 417-445
5F Special Situations
              
pp. 417-426

                    570. Market Definition to Assess Vertical Foreclosure 
                  
pp. 426-428

                    571. Mergers Across Market Boundaries 
                  
pp. 428-434

                    572. Government Regulation and Market Power 
                  
pp. 434-438

                    573. Durable Products 
                  
pp. 438-442

                    574. Multifirm Exercises of Market Power; Relevance of Concerted Action 
                  
pp. 442-445

                    575. Measuring Monopsony Power 
                  
pp. -
Chapter 6 Monopolization
          
pp. 3-4

                600. Introduction: The Monopolization Problem 
              
pp. 4-5

                601. Definitions; Qualification on "Intent" 
              
pp. 5-68
6A Key Monopolization Cases
              
pp. 5-6

                    605. Introduction 
                  
pp. 6-11

                    606. Standard Oil; Early "Rule of Reason" Formulation 
                  
pp. 11-12

                    607. American Tobacco 
                  
pp. 12-15

                    608. American Can 
                  
pp. 15-16

                    609. United States Steel 
                  
pp. 16-17

                    610. International Harvester 
                  
pp. 17-29

                    611. Alcoa 
                  
pp. 29-31

                    612. American Tobacco 
                  
pp. 31-32

                    613. Griffith 
                  
pp. 32-39

                    614. United Shoe (USM) 
                  
pp. 39-41

                    615. Grinnell 
                  
pp. 41-44

                    616. IBM Cases 
                  
pp. 44-66

                    617. Microsoft 
                  
pp. 67-68

                    618. Summary 
                  
pp. 67-89
6B The Dilemma: The Evils of Monopoly Versus Compunctions Against Condemning "Mere Monopoly"
              
pp. 67-70

                    630. Introduction and Summary 
                  
pp. 70-72

                    631. Monopoly as the Statutory Concern 
                  
pp. 72-72

                    632. Language of 2 
                  
pp. 72-75

                    633. Legislative History of 2 
                  
pp. 75-77

                    634. Monopoly as Self-Correcting 
                  
pp. 77-78

                    635. Condemning Mere Monopoly Impractical or Wasteful? 
                  
pp. 78-81

                    636. Condemning Mere Monopoly Unfair? 
                  
pp. 81-85

                    637. Condemnation of Mere Monopoly Counterproductive? 
                  
pp. 85-89

                    638. Conclusion: Persistent and Not-Inevitable Monopoly in Government Equity Proceedings 
                  
pp. 89-193
6C The Nature and Definition of "Monopolizing" Conduct: Relationship to Remedies
              
pp. 89-96

                    650. Monopolization Offense Requires Both Power and Conduct 
                  
pp. 96-130

                    651. Monopolizing Conduct Defined 
                  
pp. 130-142

                    652. Monopoly "Leveraging": Advantage in Secondary Market as Distinct 2 Offense 
                  
pp. 142-153

                    653. Remedies for Exclusionary Conduct: Injunctions and Beyond 
                  
pp. 153-155

                    654. "Ancient" Exclusionary Acts 
                  
pp. 155-156

                    655. Changing Legal Standards for Exclusionary Conduct 
                  
pp. 156-159

                    656. Criminal Sanctions and Treble Damages 
                  
pp. 159-171

                    657. Causation and Injury in 2 Cases: "Disaggregation" of Damages 
                  
pp. 171-193

                    658. Defenses and Immunities 
                  
pp. -
Chapter 7 Monopolization: Particular Exclusionary Practices
          
pp. 193-194

                700. Introduction 
              
pp. 194-214
7A Horizontal Acquisitions and Agreements
              
pp. 194-204

                    701. Mergers with Actual or Potential Competitors 
                  
pp. 204-207

                    702. Acquiring Talent; Predatory Hiring of Rivals' Employees 
                  
pp. 207-214

                    703. Price Fixing, Market Division, and Noncompetition Covenants 
                  
pp. 214-378
7B Exclusionary Practices: Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights
              
pp. 214-233

                    704. The Patent System, Anticompetitive Exclusions, and Antitrust Policy 
                  
pp. 233-251

                    705. Improprieties in Patent Procurement 
                  
pp. 251-281

                    706. Infringement Actions and Related Conduct 
                  
pp. 281-298

                    707. Patent Acquisitions and Accumulation; Grantbacks 
                  
pp. 298-305

                    708. Non-Use; Equity Alternative to Antitrust Relief 
                  
pp. 305-328

                    709. Refusal to License as Antitrust Violation; Equity Alternative 
                  
pp. 328-338

                    710. Compulsory Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy 
                  
pp. 338-347

                    711. Exclusionary Practices Involving Non-Patent Intellectual Property 
                  
pp. 347-371

                    712. IP Deceptions: Exclusionary Manipulation of Standard-Setting Process 
                  
pp. 371-378

                    713. The Federal Circuit; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Antitrust Suits Involving Patents 
                  
pp. 3-20
7C Exploitative, Predatory, and Strategic Pricing
              
pp. 3-11

                    720. Exploitative Pricing Lawful and Justified by Aversion to Price Regulation 
                  
pp. 11-20

                    721. Price Discrimination 
                  
pp. 20-46
7C-1 Strategic and Predatory Pricing: General Issues
                  
pp. 20-22

                        722. Competitive, Monopolistic, and Strategic Pricing Compared 
                      
pp. 22-35

                        723. Preliminary Considerations; Selection of Optimal Predatory Pricing Rule 
                      
pp. 35-46

                        724. Predatory Pricing: Brief Summary of Conclusions 
                      
pp. 46-126
7C-2 Predatory Pricing: Structural and Behavioral Prerequisites
                  
pp. 46-57

                        725. Predation Claims Require Strict Appraisal of Market Structure; Difficulties in Quantifying Recoupment 
                      
pp. 57-82

                        726. "Recoupment"; Brooke Decision 
                      
pp. 82-98

                        727. Monopoly and Oligopoly Recoupment Compared; Predation Benefitting Multiple Markets 
                      
pp. 98-106

                        728. Predatory Pricing as Monopolization or "Attempt"; Relationship Between Structure and Intent 
                      
pp. 106-121

                        729. Barriers to Entry or Expansion; Excess Capacity; Disposition of Victims' Assets 
                      
pp. 121-126

                        730. Output Data 
                      
pp. 126-250
7C-3 Predatory Pricing: Pricing Strategies and Price-Cost Relationships
                  
pp. 126-135

                        735. Introduction; Definitions 
                      
pp. 135-156

                        736. Long-Run Anticompetitive Pricing Strategies 
                      
pp. 156-168

                        737. Judicial Recognition of Long-Run Anticompetitive Pricing 
                      
pp. 168-176

                        738. Intent Evidence in Predation Cases 
                      
pp. 176-188

                        739. Marginal-Cost Pricing Both Competitive and Lawful 
                      
pp. 188-216

                        740. Average Variable Cost as Surrogate; Average Avoidable Cost 
                      
pp. 216-236

                        741. Average Total Cost; Long-Run Incremental Cost 
                      
pp. 236-250

                        742. Cost Measurement for Multiple Products or Differential Returns 
                      
pp. 250-349
7C-4 Predatory Pricing: Additional Problems and Situations
                  
pp. 250-271

                        745. Price Discrimination and Selective Price Cuts; "Primary Line" Provisions of Robinson-Patman Act 
                      
pp. 271-279

                        746. Promotional Pricing; "Excessive" Promotional Spending 
                      
pp. 279-301

                        747. Predatory Purchasing and Investment; Weyerhaeuser Decision 
                      
pp. 301-305

                        748. Meeting Competition as a Defense 
                      
pp. 305-349

                        749. Bundled Pricing 
                      
pp. 3-8
7D Exclusionary Practices by Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms
              
pp. 3-8

                    755. Vertical Integration: Definitions and General Conclusions 
                  
pp. 8-133
7D-1 Vertical Integration Generally: Gains, Possible Harms, and Appropriate Antitrust Rules
                  
pp. 8-25

                        756. Potential Competitive Harms: Market Power a Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition 
                      
pp. 25-29

                        757. Cost Savings from Vertical Integration: Production and Transactional Economies 
                      
pp. 29-35

                        758. Cost Savings from Vertical Integration: Double Marginalization 
                      
pp. 35-46

                        759. Vertical Integration by the Monopolist: Appropriate Rules or Presumptions 
                      
pp. 46-56

                        760. Vertical Integration and Restricted Distribution Distinguished 
                      
pp. 56-68

                        761. Power Inquiry in 2 Vertical Integration Cases 
                      
pp. 68-74

                        762. Self-Distribution in Aftermarkets 
                      
pp. 74-76

                        763. Vertical Acquisitions 
                      
pp. 76-104

                        764. Vertical Integration: Judicial Formulations on Conduct and Intent 
                      
pp. 104-111

                        765. Vertical Integration and Equity; Scope and Terms of Duty to Deal 
                      
pp. 111-133

                        766. Illustrative Vertical Integration Decisions 
                      
pp. 133-192
7D-2 Vertically Integrated Monopolist's Contract Practices Affecting Unintegrated Rivals
                  
pp. 134-151

                        767. Integrated Monopolist's Price and Supply Policies Toward Non-Integrated Rivals 
                      
pp. 151-179

                        768. Contractual Preemption of Supply or Market; Exclusive Dealing; Above-Cost Discount Policies 
                      
pp. 179-186

                        769. Lease-Only and Other Resale Restrictions 
                      
pp. 186-192

                        770. "Arbitrary" Refusal to Deal 
                      
pp. 192-280
7D-3 Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the "Essential Facility" Doctrine
                  
pp. 192-198

                        771. Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the "Essential Facility" Doctrine: Preliminary Considerations 
                      
pp. 198-237

                        772. Unilateral Refusals to Deal and "Essential Facility" Doctrine - Intuitive and Historical Rationales Through Aspen Skiing and Trinko 
                      
pp. 237-264

                        773. Unilateral Refusal to Deal and "Essential Facility" Doctrine - Technical Requirements 
                      
pp. 264-280

                        774. Unilateral Refusal to Deal and "Essential Facility" Doctrine - Standing, Antitrust Injury, and Scope of Equitable Relief 
                      
pp. 280-315
7D-4 Monopolist's Practices Affecting Collateral and Complementary Markets
                  
pp. 280-285

                        775. Introduction 
                      
pp. 285-300

                        776. Strategic Creation of Incompatibility 
                      
pp. 300-315

                        777. "Implicit" Tying by the Monopolist; Innovation Excluding Rivals' Complementary Products 
                      
pp. 315-344
7E Unfair, Predatory, and Tortious Competition Unrelated to Pricing Policies
              
pp. 315-317

                    780. Introduction; Potential Conflicts Between Antitrust Law and "Unfair Competition" Law 
                  
pp. 317-320

                    781. "Predatory" Product Innovation Without Implicit Tying 
                  
pp. 320-344

                    782. Specific Tortious Practices 
                  
pp. 344-381
7F Exclusionary Practices by the Regulated Monopolist
              
pp. 344-351

                    785. Scope; Relationship Between Antitrust Liability and Regulatory Immunities and Jurisdiction 
                  
pp. 351-353

                    786. Strategic and Predatory Pricing by Regulated Monopolist 
                  
pp. 353-381

                    787. Regulated Monopolist's Integration into Unregulated Markets: Refusal to Deal and Price Squeeze Claims 
                  
pp. 381-481
Chapter 8 Power and the Power-Conduct Relationship in Monopolization and Attempt
          
pp. 381-403
8A Substantial, or "Monopoly," Power Defined and Related to Conduct
              
pp. 381-382

                    800. Introduction 
                  
pp. 382-388

                    801. When Is Market Power "Substantial"?; Tentative Presumptions 
                  
pp. 388-397

                    802. Monopolization Offense Requires "Substantial" Power 
                  
pp. 397-403

                    803. Anticompetitive Conduct by Firms Acquiring "Substantial" Market Power 
                  
pp. 403-463
8B Attempt to Monopolize
              
pp. 403-406

                    804. Introduction; Continued Importance 
                  
pp. 406-411

                    805. Intent Requirement in Attempt Cases 
                  
pp. 411-428

                    806. Conduct Requirement and Attempt to Monopolize 
                  
pp. 428-460

                    807. "Dangerous Probability of Success"; Attempt's Power Requirement 
                  
pp. 460-463

                    808. Remedies for Attempt 
                  
pp. 463-481
8C Multiple Actors and 2
              
pp. 463-467

                    809. Conspiracy to Monopolize 
                  
pp. 467-481

                    810. "Shared" Monopoly or Oligopoly Facilitator as 2 Violation 
                  
pp. -
Chapter 9 Mergers: Generally and Horizontal
          
pp. 3-6

                900. Introduction; Basic Definitions 
              
pp. 6-13

                901. The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Mergers: An Overview 
              
pp. 13-57
9A General Guides to Interpretation
              
pp. 13-21

                    902. Brief Historical Review of Merger Law Interpretation 
                  
pp. 21-26

                    903. Legislative History of Current 7 
                  
pp. 26-30

                    904. Limited Role of Noneconomic Values in Merger Policy 
                  
pp. 30-44

                    905. Necessity and Danger of "Simple" Merger Rules; Presumptions; Burdens of Proof 
                  
pp. 44-46

                    906. Congruent Application of Sherman Act to Horizontal Mergers 
                  
pp. 46-49

                    907. Meaning and Context of "Lessen Competition" Standard 
                  
pp. 49-57

                    908. General Conclusions Summarized 
                  
pp. 57-58
9B The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Mergers
              
pp. 57-58

                    910. Introduction 
                  
pp. 58-103
9B-1 Mergers Facilitating Single Firm Exercises of Market Power
                  
pp. 58-59

                        911. Mergers Creating Monopolist or Dominant Firms 
                      
pp. 59-62

                        912. Monopolist's or Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival; Potential Competition Merger Distinguished 
                      
pp. 62-73

                        913. Power Assessment and Market Definition in Unilateral Effects Cases 
                      
pp. 73-101

                        914. Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets 
                      
pp. 101-103

                        915. Unilateral Effects Facilitated by Capacity Constraints or Differential Costs 
                      
pp. 103-124
9B-2 Mergers Facilitating Coordinated Interaction
                  
pp. 103-118

                        916. Overview; Pervasive issues 
                      
pp. 118-121

                        917. Express Collusion Attempts Create Stricter Standard 
                      
pp. 121-124

                        918. Mergers and Oligopoly; Fundamental Concern with Pricing 
                      
pp. 132-270
9C Structural Indicators of Prima Facie Illegality
              
pp. 132-169
9C-1 Pervasive Issues; General Relevance of Market Structure
                  
pp. 124-132

                        925. Relevance of Structural Inquiry 
                      
pp. 132-139

                        926. Historical Judicial and Agency Reliance on Structural Factors 
                      
pp. 139-158

                        927. Concentration Evidence Indicating Probable "Substantial" Lessening of Competition 
                      
pp. 158-159

                        928. Summary 
                      
pp. 159-169

                        929. Market Definition Problems Affecting Horizontal Merger Analysis 
                      
pp. 169-270
9C-2 Concentration Indexes: Utility, Use, and Limitations
                  
pp. 169-176

                        930. Do Concentration Indexes Improve the Accuracy of Merger Predictions? 
                      
pp. 176-191

                        931. Concentration Indexes Compared 
                      
pp. 191-207

                        932. Structural Criteria for Presumptive Illegality 
                      
pp. -
9C-3 Structural Factors Other Than Seller Number or Shares
                  
pp. 207-210

                        940. Introduction; Nonconcentration Factors of Limited Significance 
                      
pp. 210-241

                        941. Barriers and Impediments to Entry 
                      
pp. 241-249

                        942. Heterogeneous Products, Processes, and Costs 
                      
pp. 249-259

                        943. Buyer Sophistication, Size, and Concentration 
                      
pp. 259-270

                        944. Other Factors Affecting the Competitive Significance of Concentration Measures; Government Guidelines 
                      
pp. 270-311
9D The Failing Company Defense
              
pp. 270-271

                    950. Introduction; Market-Share Statistics May Overstate Firm's Viability or Competitive Impact 
                  
pp. -
9D-1 The Failing Company Defense
                  
pp. 271-275

                        951. Introductory Issues 
                      
pp. 275-283

                        952. Appropriate Rationales and Limits of a Failing Firm Defense 
                      
pp. 283-293

                        953. Defining "Failing" Company 
                      
pp. 293-309

                        954. Varying Proof Requirements; Search for Preferred Alternative Purchaser 
                      
pp. 309-311

                        955. Newspaper Preservation Act 
                      
pp. 3-23
9D-2 Firm-Specific Factors Other than Failure
                  
pp. 3-4

                        960. Factors Bearing on Firm Vitality Generally 
                      
pp. 4-4

                        961. Preexisting Relationships 
                      
pp. 4-11

                        962. Inadequate Resources 
                      
pp. 11-18

                        963. Financial and Management Difficulties Falling Short of Failure 
                      
pp. 18-21

                        964. Relevance of Intent 
                      
pp. 21-23

                        965. Simple Structural Analysis Understates Competitive Significance of Merger 
                      
pp. 23-108
9E Economies as Defense to Prima Facie Illegality
              
pp. 23-40

                    970. Introduction; Principle and History Justifies Economies Defense 
                  
pp. 40-49

                    971. Must Qualifying Efficiencies Be "Passed on" to Consumers? 
                  
pp. 49-53

                    972. Offsetting Benefits in Second Market 
                  
pp. 53-67

                    973. Necessity and Identification of "Merger Specific" Economies 
                  
pp. 67-79

                    974. General Magnitude and Nature of Provable Economies 
                  
pp. 79-102

                    975. Classification of Permissible Economies 
                  
pp. 102-108

                    976. Conclusion: Presumptive Rules for Efficiency Claims 
                  
pp. 108-113
9F Horizontal Merger Rules for Buyers
              
pp. 108-110

                    980. Introduction: The Need for Special Rules 
                  
pp. 110-112

                    981. Asymmetries Between Buyer and Seller Concentration Effects 
                  
pp. 112-113

                    982. Conclusion; Presumptive Rules 
                  
pp. 113-137
9G Remedies
              
pp. 113-137

                    990. Remedies: A Brief Introduction and Government Guides 
                  
pp. 137-293
Chapter 10 Vertical Mergers
          
pp. 137-142

                1000. Introduction 
              
pp. 142-146

                1001. Preview and Summary 
              
pp. 146-149

                1002. Statutory Language and History 
              
pp. 149-222
10A Economic Consequences of Vertical Mergers
              
pp. 149-212
10A-1 Potential Harms
                  
pp. 150-158

                        1003. Vertical Integration Fallacies: Increased Monopoly Profit and "Unfair" Advantages over Rivals 
                      
pp. 158-168

                        1004. Foreclosure 
                      
pp. 168-171

                        1005. Reduced Competitiveness in Either Market; Facilitation of Coordination 
                      
pp. 171-177

                        1006. Disruptive Buyer Eliminated 
                      
pp. 177-180

                        1007. Second-Level Concentration Increased 
                      
pp. 180-184

                        1008. Raising Rivals' Costs-Deprivation of Efficient Inputs or Scale 
                      
pp. 184-188

                        1009. Rivals Destabilized 
                      
pp. 188-189

                        1010. Consumer Choice Reduced 
                      
pp. 189-202

                        1011. Entry Barriers 
                      
pp. 202-209

                        1012. Price Discrimination; Possible Relationship to Foreclosure 
                      
pp. 209-212

                        1013. Rate Regulation Evasion 
                      
pp. 212-222
10A-2 Potential Economic Benefits and Other Economic Effects of Vertical Mergers
                  
pp. 212-213

                        1020. Introduction; Overview 
                      
pp. 213-215

                        1021. Production and Transaction Cost Savings 
                      
pp. 215-218

                        1022. Vertical Mergers and Double Marginalization 
                      
pp. 218-221

                        1023. Obstruct Oligopolistic Coordination or Collusion 
                      
pp. 221-222

                        1024. Eliminate or Vary Input Substitution 
                      
pp. 222-239
10B Assessing Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers
              
pp. 222-225

                    1030. Special Market Definition Problems for Measuring the Effects of Vertical Mergers 
                  
pp. 225-234

                    1031. Initial and Cumulative Foreclosures; Trends 
                  
pp. 234-239

                    1032. Suggested Presumptions for Vertical Merger Illegality 
                  
pp. 239-293
10C Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Other Defenses
              
pp. 239-248

                    1040. Efficiencies Defense to Prima Facie Illegality 
                  
pp. 248-251

                    1041. Vertical Acquisitions Involving Failing Firms 
                  
pp. 253-277

                Appendix A Horizontal Merger Decisions Summarized
              
pp. 279-293

                Appendix B Vertical Merger Decisions Summarized
              
pp. 3-254
Chapter 11 Potential Competition and Other "Conglomerate" Mergers
          
pp. 3-5

                1100. Definition and General Approach 
              
pp. 5-6
11A Merger Motivations and Their Relevance to Tests of Illegality
              
pp. 5-6

                    1101. Introduction 
                  
pp. 14-14
11A-1 Economies Generally
                  
pp. 7-14

                        1102. The Relevance of Economies 
                      
pp. 17-49
11A-2 Particular Cost Motivations
                  
pp. 14-17

                        1103. Purchasing 
                      
pp. 17-24

                        1104. Capital Cost Savings and Other Purely Financial Motives 
                      
pp. 24-32

                        1105. Economies, Mainly of Scale and Scope; Product Complementarity. 
                      
pp. 32-49

                        1106. Marketing Gains 
                      
pp. 49-52
11A-3 Other Merger Motivations
                  
pp. 49-52

                        1107. Protective Mergers 
                      
pp. 52-52

                        1108. Summary: A Free Market for Capital Assets 
                      
pp. 53-54
11B Structural and Other Market Indicators of Likely Anticompetitive Effects
              
pp. 53-54

                    1120. Introduction 
                  
pp. 54-167
11B-1 Mergers Reducing or Eliminating Potential Competition
                  
pp. 54-59

                        1121. Overview: Possible Effects and Key Issues 
                      
pp. 59-60

                        1122. Monopolist's Acquisition of Nascent Rival Recalled 
                      
pp. 60-61

                        1123. Actual Present Competitor Distinguished; Merger Guidelines 
                      
pp. 61-63

                        1124. Statutory Coverage 
                      
pp. 63-79

                        1125. Noncompetitive Target Market Prerequisite to Present or Future Effect from Potential Entry 
                      
pp. 79-93

                        1126. Additional Prerequisites for Present Effect from Potential Entry 
                      
pp. 93-96

                        1127. Actual and Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrines Summarized; Government Guidelines 
                      
pp. 96-115

                        1128. Outside Firm as Probable Future Entrant 
                      
pp. 115-118

                        1129. Outside Firm as Perceived Potential Entrant. 
                      
pp. 118-137

                        1130. Universe of Potential Entrants 
                      
pp. 137-149

                        1131. Non-"Toehold" Acquisitions Forbidden? 
                      
pp. 149-154

                        1132. Procompetitive Effects Balanced; Toeholds Permitted? 
                      
pp. 154-161

                        1133. Distinguishing Vertical and Potential Competition Merger; Other Vertical Effects 
                      
pp. 161-162

                        1134. Conclusion: Continued Viability of Potential Competition Merger Doctrine 
                      
pp. 163-167

                        1135. Common Carrier Immunity for Potential Competition Mergers 
                      
pp. 168-226
11B-2 Other Possible Anticompetitive Effects
                  
pp. 168-169

                        1140. Introduction. 
                      
pp. 169-175

                        1141. Extended Interdependence from Cross-Market Mergers 
                      
pp. 175-184

                        1142. Mergers Uniting Imperfect Substitutes 
                      
pp. 184-194

                        1143. Mergers Facilitating Reciprocity 
                      
pp. 194-204

                        1144. Transferred Leverage: Tying 
                      
pp. 204-209

                        1145. Other Possible Competitive Effects from Resource Aggregation 
                      
pp. 209-213

                        1146. Facilitation of Predatory Practices 
                      
pp. 213-216

                        1147. Disciplinary Pricing in Oligopoly; Price Leadership 
                      
pp. 216-218

                        1148. Failure to Maximize; Other Unfair Pricing Practices 
                      
pp. 218-226

                        1149. Condemning Asset Aggregation for Its Own Sake 
                      
pp. 226-254
11C Statutory Meaning, Proof of Effects, Defenses
              
pp. 226-238

                    1160. Proof of Anticompetitive Effects Required 
                  
pp. 238-239

                    1161. Redeeming Virtues; Relationship to Prohibition Standards 
                  
pp. 240-245

                    1162. Efficiencies 
                  
pp. 245-252

                    1163. Failing Firms 
                  
pp. 252-254

                    1164. Weak Firms 
                  
pp. 255-326
Chapter 12 Scope of Covered Acquisitions and Relevant Time of Appraisal
          
pp. 255-255

                1200. Introduction: Issues 
              
pp. 256-264

                1201. "Acquire" - Scope and Timing of Covered Acquisitions 
              
pp. 264-283

                1202. Partial Asset Acquisitions 
              
pp. 283-291

                1203. Partial Stock Acquisitions 
              
pp. 292-301

                1204. Stock Acquisitions "Solely for Investment" 
              
pp. 301-326

                1205. Consummated Mergers; Post-Acquisition Evidence 
              
pp. 327-344
Chapter 13 Interlocking Directors and Other Officers
          
pp. 327-328

                1300. Introduction; the Problem 
              
pp. 328-331

                1301. Relevant Statutes 
              
pp. 332-339

                1302. Horizontal Interlocks 
              
pp. 339-340

                1303. Vertical Interlocks 
              
pp. 340-342

                1304. Indirect Interlocks 
              
pp. 342-344

                1305. Mootness 
              
  pp. -
Part Three: Restraints of Trade: Horizontal and Vertical
      
pp. 1-xxx
Chapter 14 Conspiracy, Horizontal and Vertical
          
pp. 1-5

                1400. Introduction 
              
pp. 5-7
14A Pervasive Issues and Critical Distinctions
              
pp. 5-7

                    1401. Preview 
                  
pp. 7-53
14A-1 Statutory Rationale and General Issues
                  
pp. 7-16

                        1402. Statutory Rationale for Conspiracy Requirement 
                      
pp. 7-16

                        1402. Statutory Rationale for Conspiracy Requirement 
                      
pp. 16-17

                        1403. Distinction Between "Combination" and "Conspiracy" Generally Unnecessary 
                      
pp. 18-20

                        1404. How Much Assent? 
                      
pp. 20-24

                        1405. Proof Criteria and Burdens; Judge and Jury 
                      
pp. 24-28

                        1406. Interfirm Contact as Agreement 
                      
pp. 29-39

                        1407. Facilitating Practices; Statutory Remedies 
                      
pp. 39-53

                        1408. Coerced Agreements; Acts Motivated by Fear of Another 
                      
pp. 54-101
14A-2 Steps in Finding Agreement
                  
pp. 54-59

                        1409. Identifying Agreeing Parties and Content of Agreement 
                      
pp. 59-66

                        1410. Distinguishing Commitment from Interdependence 
                      
pp. 66-68

                        1411. Interdependence I: No Conspiracy Inference from Parallelism Without It 
                      
pp. 68-79

                        1412. Interdependence II: Motivation for Agreement 
                      
pp. 79-91

                        1413. Interdependence III: No Independent Reason for Challenged Behavior; Lower Court Decisions 
                      
pp. 91-92

                        1414. Interdependence IV: Benefit from Agreement 
                      
pp. 92-101

                        1415. Interdependence V: Action Against Self-Interest 
                      
pp. 101-205
14B Traditional Conspiracy
              
pp. 101-104

                    1416. Introduction; Topics Considered 
                  
pp. 104-115

                    1417. Conspiratorial Opportunity, Unexplained Meetings, Furtive Behavior, and Cover-ups 
                  
pp. 115-122

                    1418. Discussions and Participant Admissions: Meaning-Facilitating Practice or More-and Reliability 
                  
pp. 122-138

                    1419. Solicitations: Accepted or Not; Remedy Under FTC Act 5 
                  
pp. 138-145

                    1420. Identical or Sham Bidding; Refusal to Bid 
                  
pp. 145-154

                    1421. Conspiracy or Competition in Other Markets or Times 
                  
pp. 154-159

                    1422. Information or Inquiry as Facilitating Practice or as Evidence of Further Conspiracy-Generally 
                  
pp. 159-163

                    1423. Information Exchanges About Customers or Suppliers as Establishing Unlawful Agreement 
                  
pp. 164-167

                    1424. Threat to Potential Victim of Concerted Action 
                  
pp. 167-185

                    1425. `"Unnatural Parallelism" Too Close for Coincidence; Simultaneous Versus Sequential Actions 
                  
pp. 185-197

                    1426. Interstate Circuit 
                  
pp. 198-205

                    1427. Masonite 
                  
pp. 205-293
14C Parallel Behavior Among Oligopolists
              
pp. 205-206

                    1428. Introduction and Summary 
                  
pp. 206-209

                    1429. Oligopoly Makes Interdependent Behavior Inevitable 
                  
pp. 209-213

                    1430. Factors Affecting Likelihood of Oligopolistic Coordination 
                  
pp. 214-218

                    1431. Appraising Oligopoly Markets 
                  
pp. 219-236

                    1432. Tacit Oligopolistic Price Coordination as Conspiracy 
                  
pp. 236-241

                    1433. What Courts Actually Do: Interdependent Parallelism Without "Plus Factors" 
                  
pp. 241-250

                    1434. Parallelism with "Plus Factors"; Decisions 
                  
pp. 251-268

                    1435. Collective and Unilateral Facilitating Practices: Business Utilities and Market Effects 
                  
pp. 268-293

                    1436. Facilitating Practices and Other Interdependence Remediable Under Federal Trade Commission Act or Sherman Act 
                  
pp. 1-19
14D Vertical Agreement and Refusals to Deal
              
pp. 1-7

                    1437. Vertical Agreements Generally 
                  
pp. 7-19

                    1438. Vertical Agreements: Summary 
                  
pp. 19-121
14D-1 Supplier's Refusal to Deal with Those Not Complying with Announced Conditions
                  
pp. 19-22

                        1439. Degrees of Refusal to Deal 
                      
pp. 22-26

                        1440. Suggested Resale Prices or Other Behavior 
                      
pp. 26-39

                        1441. Initial Selection and Subsequent Replacement of Dealers 
                      
pp. 39-44

                        1442. Announced Conditions for Future Dealing 
                      
pp. 44-53

                        1443. Complying Dealers as Co-Conspirators-Extended Agreement Theory I: Knowing Purchaser Accepts Seller's Terms 
                      
pp. 53-60

                        1444. Complying Dealers as Co-Conspirators-Extended Agreement Theory II: Widespread Compliance with Announced Condition Reflects Coercion and Therefore Agreement 
                      
pp. 60-68

                        1445. Colgate Case Allows Announced Conditions on Future Dealing 
                      
pp. 69-78

                        1446. Monsanto's Revitalization of Colgate 
                      
pp. 79-85

                        1447. Individualized "Negotiation" as Agreement Under Monsanto and Parke, Davis; Dealer "Admits Agreement" 
                      
pp. 85-90

                        1448. Implied Agreements or Firmly Resolute Enforcement Under Schrader's, Frey, Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Schwinn Cases; Status After Monsanto 
                      
pp. 90-99

                        1449. Using Wholesalers or Other Complex Enforcement of Announced Conditions: Status of Parke, Davis After Monsanto 
                      
pp. 99-103

                        1450. Agreements with "Pawns" or Other Third Parties: Status of Albrecht After Monsanto 
                      
pp. 103-112

                        1451. Coerced or Unwilling Compliance by Terminated Dealer 
                      
pp. 112-121

                        1452. Termination as Proof of Agreement with Others 
                      
pp. 122-190
14D-2 Dealer Complains to Supplier About Rival Dealer
                  
pp. 122-130

                        1453. The Problem: Inherent Ambiguities of Complaint, Termination, and Antitrust Policy 
                      
pp. 130-134

                        1454. Monsanto and Conspiracy with Complaining Dealers 
                      
pp. 134-136

                        1455. Termination Merely "After" Complaint 
                      
pp. 136-145

                        1456. Plaintiff Terminated "in Response to" Rival's Complaint 
                      
pp. 145-160

                        1457. Manufacturer Terminates in Response to Rival's Complaint: Coerced Suppliers 
                      
pp. 160-171

                        1458. Complaint and Termination as Meeting of Minds; Lower Court Decisions 
                      
pp. 171-187

                        1459. Damage and Standing Issues 
                      
pp. 187-190

                        1460. Clayton Act 3 and Federal Trade Commission Act 5 
                      
pp. 190-195
14E Intraenterprise Conspiracy: Corporate Affiliates, Employees, Agents, Pawns, Associations and Joint Ventures
              
pp. 190-195

                    1462. The Firm as a Single Actor and the Conspiracy Concept 
                  
pp. 195-227
14E-1 Corporations Wholly Owned in Common
                  
pp. 195-203

                        1463. Supreme Court Intraenterprise Conspiracy Cases from Yellow Cab to Copperweld 
                      
pp. 203-217

                        1464. Commonly Owned Corporations: Statutory Language and Policy 
                      
pp. 217-220

                        1465. "Holding Out" or Intended Independence 
                      
pp. 220-227

                        1466. Less than Complete Common Ownership; Introductory Issues 
                      
pp. 227-246
14E-2 Common Control Without Completely Common Ownership
                  
pp. 227-240

                        1467. Identifying a Single Economic Unit 
                      
pp. 240-242

                        1468. Agreement in Fact? 
                      
pp. 242-246

                        1469. Broader Criteria of Reasonableness 
                      
pp. 247-302
14E-3 Employees, Divisions, and Agents
                  
pp. 247-249

                        1470. Employees Generally and Unincorporated Divisions 
                      
pp. 249-267

                        1471. Employee with "Independent" Interest 
                      
pp. 267-268

                        1472. Employees Acting Without Authorization 
                      
pp. 269-289

                        1473. Distribution Agents Restrained 
                      
pp. 200-201

                        1473.1. The Distribution Agency Issue Under Leegin's Rule of Reason 
                      
pp. 290-302

                        1474. Agents and "Pawns" Aiding a Restraint 
                      
pp. 302-334
14E-4 Conspiracies Among members of Associations And Joint Ventures
                  
pp. 302-305

                        1475. The Problem and Initial Distinctions 
                      
pp. 305-310

                        1476. Usual Business Entity: Formation and Later Merger or Cartel 
                      
pp. 310-318

                        1477. Trade Associations and Concerted Rule Making 
                      
pp. 318-334

                        1478. Productive Joint Ventures as Single Entity or Continuing Conspiracy 
                      
pp. 335-446
Chapter 15 The "Rule of Reason" and "Per Se" Rule - General Issues
          
pp. 335-338

                1500. Why Reasonableness Matters 
              
pp. 338-343

                1501. "Every" Restraint Embraces Only "Unreasonable" Restraints 
              
pp. 344-346

                1502. "Restraint of Trade" Means Restraint on Competition 
              
pp. 346-356

                1503. Competitive Evil: Tendency and Magnitude 
              
pp. 356-370

                1504. Legitimate Objectives 
              
pp. 370-375

                1505. Restraint Reasonably Necessary for Legitimate Objective: Actual Connection Without Less Restrictive Alternative 
              
pp. 375-380

                1506. Role of Intent 
              
pp. 380-390

                1507. Tentative Presumptions: Balancing 
              
pp. 390-395

                1508. Applying Rule of Reason Summarily 
              
pp. 396-404

                1509. Per Se Rationale: Class Unreasonableness 
              
pp. 404-418

                1510. Per Se Rules: Different Meanings; Redeeming Virtue Recognized Through Exceptions or Classification 
              
pp. 418-442

                1511. Collapsing Reasonableness-Per Se Distinction: Single Inquiry with Varying Presumptions? 
              
pp. 442-446

                1512. The Rule of Reason for Unilateral Conduct 
              
pp. 1-523
Chapter 16 Vertical Distribution Restraints Limiting Intrabrand Competition
          
pp. 1-206
16A Pervasive Legal and Economic Issues
              
pp. 1-31
16A-1 Introduction: Possible Effects Summarized
                  
pp. 1-11

                        1600. Introduction to Distribution Restraints 
                      
pp. 11-22

                        1601. Motives and Effects of Intrabrand Restraints; Preview 
                      
pp. 22-31

                        1602. Availability of Business Alternatives 
                      
pp. 31-126
16A-2 Legal Analogies and Major Harms
                  
pp. 31-34

                        1603. Vertical Restraint Less Dangerous Than Horizontal Restraint 
                      
pp. 35-68

                        1604. Intrabrand Restraints Serving Dealer Power 
                      
pp. 68-81

                        1605. Dual Distribution 
                      
pp. 81-105

                        1606. Parallel Action by Manufacturers 
                      
pp. 105-109

                        1607. Manufacturer Self-Interest or Error 
                      
pp. 109-113

                        1608. Vertical Integration Compared 
                      
pp. 113-122

                        1609. Dealer Freedom Impaired 
                      
pp. 122-126

                        1610. Distribution Restraint Exchanged for Exclusive Dealing or Tying 
                      
pp. 126-206
16A-3 Procompetitive Potential of Distribution Restraints
                  
pp. 126-139

                        1611. Distribution Restraints Presumptively Efficient 
                      
pp. 139-151

                        1612. Dealer Services Efficient or "Excessive"? 
                      
pp. 151-165

                        1613. Less Tangible Image Service and Free Riders Generally 
                      
pp. 165-174

                        1614. Dealer Goodwill, Recommendations, and Inventory Management 
                      
pp. 174-182

                        1615. Scale Economies of Distribution Protected or Obstructed 
                      
pp. 182-193

                        1616. Intensive Market Penetration, Dealer Specialization, and Price Discrimination 
                      
pp. 193-199

                        1617. Promoting New Entry, Expansion, or Survival 
                      
pp. 199-204

                        1618. Product Quality and Safety 
                      
pp. 204-206

                        1619. Loss Leaders 
                      
pp. 206-339
16B Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
              
pp. 207-288
16B-1 RPM: The Per Se Rule and Its Limits
                  
pp. 207-217

                        1620. In the Beginning: The Dr. Miles Case 
                      
pp. 225-242

                        1620.1. Dr. Miles Overruled 
                      
pp. 217-222

                        1621. Agencies and Products Copyrighted or Patented 
                      
pp. 222-231

                        1622. "Resale" Distinguished from Other Prices 
                      
pp. 231-245

                        1623. Influencing Resale Prices Without Traditional Agreements: Suggested Prices, Announced Conditions, Coerced Dealers, or Rivals' Complaints; Remedial Problems 
                      
pp. 245-254

                        1624. Price Versus Nonprice Restraint when Explicit Nonprice Agreement 
                      
pp. 254-272

                        1625. Price Versus Nonprice Restraint When No Formal Agreement on Either Subject 
                      
pp. 243-244

                        1625.1. Price Versus Nonprice Restraint; Supreme Court's Leegin Decision 
                      
pp. 272-276

                        1626. Conditional Reimbursements; Cooperative Advertising 
                      
pp. 277-288

                        1627. Wholesale Price Formula or "Condition" 
                      
pp. 288-339
16B-2 Reforming the Dr. Miles Rule of Per Se Illegality
                  
pp. 288-295

                        1628. Reform Impulses; Types and Costs 
                      
pp. 295-302

                        1629. Stare Decisis; Implications of Repealing Fair Trade 
                      
pp. 302-306

                        1630. Asymmetrical Legal Treatment of Nonprice Restraints; Agreement Complications 
                      
pp. 306-315

                        1631. Potential Benefits Weighing Against Per Se Illegality 
                      
pp. 316-328

                        1632. Potential Evils; Structural Characteristics Facilitating Competitive Harm 
                      
pp. 328-339

                        1633. Alternatives to Per Se Illegality 
                      
pp. 339-376
16C Maximum Resale Price Limitations
              
pp. 339-340

                    1634. Introduction 
                  
pp. 340-347

                    1635. Principal Supreme Court Decisions: Albrecht and Khan 
                  
pp. 347-352

                    1636. Maximum RPM Justified: Limiting Dealer Monopoly 
                  
pp. 352-361

                    1637. Possible Competitive Evils 
                  
pp. 361-362

                    1638. The Future of Maximum Resale Price Limitations 
                  
pp. 362-371

                    1639. Indirect Influences on Maximum Resale Prices 
                  
pp. 371-376

                    1640. Attacking Price Ceilings: Standing and Antitrust Injury 
                  
pp. 376-471
16D Territorial or Customer Limitations on Dealers
              
pp. 376-381

                    1641. Preview: "Restraints" Defined and "Agreement" Recalled 
                  
pp. 381-389

                    1642. Legal Developments Through White Motor and Schwinn Cases 
                  
pp. 389-393

                    1643. Sylvania 
                  
pp. 393-401

                    1644. Rejecting Per Se Illegal Price, Boycott, or Horizontal Restraint Characterizations 
                  
pp. 401-411

                    1645. Post-Sylvania Cases Applying Rule of Reason 
                  
pp. 411-417

                    1646. Business Justifications: General Issues 
                  
pp. 417-432

                    1647. Particular Business Justifications: Legitimacy and Necessity of Restraint 
                  
pp. 432-459

                    1648. Identifying Anticompetitive Dangers 
                  
pp. 459-471

                    1649. Structured Rule of Reason for Customer and Territorial Restraints 
                  
pp. 471-523
16E Single Dealer Appointed for Region or Customer Class
              
pp. 471-473

                    1650. Introduction and Definitions 
                  
pp. 473-478

                    1651. Intensity of Intrabrand Restraint 
                  
pp. 479-487

                    1652. Related Legal Concepts Compared 
                  
pp. 487-501

                    1653. Sole Outlet Threat to Market Competition; Lower Court Decisions 
                  
pp. 501-513

                    1654. Detriments-Mainly Dealer Power-and Remedies 
                  
pp. 513-523

                    1655. Justifications 
                  
pp. -
Chapter 17 Tying Arrangements and Related Practices
          
pp. 2-16

                1700. Introduction I: Definitions, Concerns, and Statutory Coverage 
              
pp. 16-27

                1701. Introduction II: Capsule History 
              
pp. 27-30

                1702. Introduction III: Black Letter Doctrine 
              
pp. 30-214
17A Anti- and Procompetitive Impact
              
pp. 30-47

                    1703. Effects and Motivations Summarized 
                  
pp. 47-53

                    1704. Foreclosure Mechanism: Creating Monopoly or Oligopoly in Tied Market 
                  
pp. 53-61

                    1705. Long-Run Entrenchment and Stagnation 
                  
pp. 61-67

                    1706. Price-Output Effects of New Monopoly or Oligopoly in Tied Market; Sequential Monopoly 
                  
pp. 67-75

                    1707. Facilitating Coordination Among Tied Market Oligopolists 
                  
pp. 75-76

                    1708. Excluded Dealer Claims Foreclosure by Tying 
                  
pp. 76-93

                    1709. Assessing Market Foreclosure 
                  
pp. 94-100

                    1710. Intensified Exploitation of Preexisting Market Power 
                  
pp. 100-115

                    1711. Tying and Price Discrimination 
                  
pp. 115-124

                    1712. Additional or Disguised Exploitation Versus Efficient Pricing or Proper Reward 
                  
pp. 124-134

                    1713. Tying by New Entrant or Weak Firm 
                  
pp. 134-143

                    1714. Temporary Promotion In Either Market 
                  
pp. 143-153

                    1715. Indirect, Selective, or Disguised Price Cuts in Either Market 
                  
pp. 154-180

                    1716. Protect Goodwill or Quality of Tying Product; Tied Product Specifications as Less Restrictive Alternative 
                  
pp. 180-206

                    1717. Cost Savings and Product Improvements 
                  
pp. 206-214

                    1718. Miscellaneous Additional Functions or Effects 
                  
pp. 214-219
17B Effects Required for Illegality
              
pp. 214-219

                    1719. Overview; One Test Under Several Statutes 
                  
pp. 219-252
17B-1 Effects Required by So-Called Rule of Per Se Illegality
                  
pp. 219-236

                        1720. The Per Se Rule 
                      
pp. 236-252

                        1721. Defining "Not Insubstantial" Volume of Tied Commerce 
                      
pp. 252-316
17B-2 Qualifications When Foreclosure or Tied Market Are Absent
                  
pp. 252-262

                        1722. Per Se Threshold: Potential Anticompetitive Effects or Power in Tied-Product Market 
                      
pp. 262-269

                        1723. Zero Foreclosure: No Rival Sellers 
                      
pp. 269-275

                        1724. Zero Foreclosure: Rivals Would Not Supply Tied Product in Any Event; Unwanted Tied Product 
                      
pp. 275-288

                        1725. Intrinsically Insignificant Foreclosures, Especially of Dealers and Franchisees 
                      
pp. 288-300

                        1726. No Relevant Foreclosure: No Financial Interest in Suppliers of Tied Product 
                      
pp. 301-316

                        1727. Relevant Foreclosure Tests: Arguable Financial Interests 
                      
pp. 316-359
17B-3 Rules of Reason Reforms
                  
pp. 316-316

                        Rule of Reason Reforms 
                      
pp. 316-326

                        1728. Residual Reasonability Test for Non-Per Se Ties 
                      
pp. 327-351

                        1729. Proving Unreasonable Effects Under the Rule of Reason 
                      
pp. 351-359

                        1730. Per Se Rule Critique; Recommended Reform 
                      
pp. 1-153
17C Power in Market for Tying Product
              
pp. 1-4

                    1731. Power in Tying Doctrine and Analysis: Introduction and Preview 
                  
pp. 4-12

                    1732. Identifying the Tying Product 
                  
pp. 12-35

                    1733. The Supreme Court and Power 
                  
pp. 35-52

                    1734. Relevance of Power in Tying-Product Market 
                  
pp. 52-65

                    1735. Substantial Power Required Beyond Opportunistic Exploitation 
                  
pp. 65-79

                    1736. Market Analysis to Prove Power 
                  
pp. 79-88

                    1737. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Trade Secrets 
                  
pp. 89-96

                    1738. Power Inferred from Tied Product Price or from Appreciable Number of Ties 
                  
pp. 96-116

                    1739. Unique, Distinctive, or Differentiated Product 
                  
pp. 116-153

                    1740. Market Imperfections, "Lock-in," and Single-Brand "Aftermarket" 
                  
pp. 150-151
17D Identifying Ties
              
pp. 151-260
17D-1 Separate Products?
                  
pp. 153-161

                        1741. Separate Products Methodology: Natural Law, Policy, or Screen? 
                      
pp. 161-166

                        1742. Different Tests under Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason? 
                      
pp. 166-170

                        1743. Threshold Requirements and Burdens: Buyer Interest and Seller Ability 
                      
pp. 170-179

                        1744. The Primary Test: Competitive Market Practices 
                      
pp. 179-206

                        1745. The Primary Test and Precedent 
                      
pp. 206-212

                        1746. The New-Product Rationale 
                      
pp. 213-225

                        1747. The Same-Product Rationale 
                      
pp. 225-232

                        1748. The Finished-Product Rationale 
                      
pp. 232-245

                        1749. Bundling Encouraged by Intellectual Property Provisions or Other Legislation 
                      
pp. 246-250

                        1750. The Phantom Separate Product 
                      
pp. 250-260

                        1751. Rejected or Severely Limited Tests 
                      
pp. 260-336
17D-2 Tied Together
                  
pp. 260-273

                        1752. Basic Rules and Preview 
                      
pp. 273-282

                        1753. Express Tying Contract 
                      
pp. 282-293

                        1754. Tying Condition Triggers Sherman and Clayton Acts 
                      
pp. 293-297

                        1755. Uncommunicated Tying Condition 
                      
pp. 297-317

                        1756. Proving Understood Condition 
                      
pp. 317-323

                        1757. Technological Tie 
                      
pp. 323-336

                        1758. Package Discounts 
                      
pp. 337-398
17E Defenses
              
pp. 337-357

                    1760. The Role of Justifications in Tying Jurisprudence 
                  
pp. 357-377

                    1761. Protect or Create Goodwill, Create or Ensure Product Quality, Control Free Riding 
                  
pp. 377-389

                    1762. Cost Savings 
                  
pp. 389-393

                    1763. Metering for Price Discrimination, Risk Allocation, and Royalties 
                  
pp. 393-398

                    1764. Other Possible Justifications 
                  
pp. 398-430
17F Injury-In-Fact, Causation, Antitrust Injury, and Damages
              
pp. 399-402

                    1766. Standing Concepts Recalled and Summarized 
                  
pp. 402-407

                    1767. Suits by Foreclosed Rivals 
                  
pp. 407-410

                    1768. Suits by Suppliers to Defendant or to Foreclosed Rivals 
                  
pp. 410-425

                    1769. Suits by Buyers 
                  
pp. 425-429

                    1770. Suits by Would-Be Buyers 
                  
pp. 430-515
17G Tying Analogies and Extensions
              
pp. 430-451
17G-1 Reciprocity and Other Buying-Power Leverage
                  
pp. 430-433

                        1775. Reciprocity: Introduction and Summary 
                      
pp. 433-437

                        1776. Possible Threats to Competition 
                      
pp. 438-442

                        1777. Procompetitive Effects of Reciprocity 
                      
pp. 442-450

                        1778. Minimum Conditions for Illegality 
                      
pp. 450-451

                        1779. Conditioning Purchase (or Sale) of One Product on Supply of Second Product 
                      
pp. 451-515
17G-2 Patent Tying and Quasi-Tying Practices
                  
pp. 452-461

                        1780. Antitrust and Patent Policy 
                      
pp. 461-476

                        1781. Patent "Misuse" and Tying; Doctrinal Development and Meaning 
                      
pp. 467-509

                        1782. Patent Practices Sometimes Analogized to Ties 
                      
pp. 510-515

                        1783. Government Policy 
                      
pp. 3-200
Chapter 18 Exclusive Dealing and Related Practices
          
pp. 3-67
18A Exclusive Dealing and Related Practices
              
pp. 3-28

                    1800. Exclusive Dealing: Definitions; Statutory Coverage 
                  
pp. 28-67

                    1801. Principal Exclusive Dealing and Output Contract Decisions-Power, Effects, and Possible Benefits 
                  
pp. 68-135
18B Possible Anticompetitive Harms
              
pp. 68-99

                    1802. Requirements Contracts Foreclosing Markets and Deterring Entry 
                  
pp. 99-111

                    1803. Output Contract Foreclosing Rival's Access to Supply 
                  
pp. 111-118

                    1804. Exclusive Contracts Raising Rivals' Costs 
                  
pp. 118-124

                    1805. Facilitation of Collusion or Oligopoly 
                  
pp. 124-127

                    1806. Exclusive Dealing as Price Discrimination or Metering Device 
                  
pp. 127-135

                    1807. Anticompetitive Discounting, Slotting Allowance, and Related Practices 
                  
pp. 136-160
18C Economic Benefits of Exclusive Dealing
              
pp. 136-136

                    1810. Introduction 
                  
pp. 136-145

                    1811. Assurance of Outlet or Supply; Bidding for Markets 
                  
pp. 145-154

                    1812. "Interbrand" Free Riding 
                  
pp. 155-157

                    1813. Risk Management, Quality Control, and Natural Monopoly 
                  
pp. 158-160

                    1814. Benefits of Co-Investment; Sole Ownership Compared 
                  
pp. 160-200
18D Pleading, Proof, and Defense of Exclusive-Dealing Claims
              
pp. 160-167

                    1820. Basic Test of Legality 
                  
pp. 167-191

                    1821. Prima Facie Exclusive Dealing Case 
                  
pp. 191-198

                    1822. Proof of Defenses; Reasonable Justifications 
                  
pp. 199-200

                    1823. Standing, Injury, and Related Issues 
                  
pp. 201-356
Chapter 19 Horizontal Agreements: An Introduction
          
pp. 201-201

                1900. Overview 
              
pp. 202-226
19A The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Restraints
              
pp. 202-209

                    1901. Horizontal Restraints: Definitions, Use, General Assumptions 
                  
pp. 209-223

                    1902. Horizontal Agreements Receive Antitrust's Most Severe Scrutiny 
                  
pp. 223-226

                    1903. Administrability of Judicial Intervention Against Multilateral Activity 
                  
pp. 227-278
19B Identification of "Naked" and "Ancillary" Restraints
              
pp. 227-228

                    1904. Introduction 
                  
pp. 228-236

                    1905. Narrow Concept of "Ancillary" Restraint in Addyston Pipe Decision 
                  
pp. 236-242

                    1906. "Naked" Restraints Defined; Ancillary Restraints Distinguished 
                  
pp. 243-251

                    1907. Defenses Limited 
                  
pp. 251-278

                    1908. Factors Relevant to Determining Ancillarity 
                  
pp. 278-356
19C Horizontal Restraints: General Rules for Determining Legality
              
pp. 278-280

                    1909. Introduction 
                  
pp. 280-294

                    1910. Per Se Illegality for "Naked" Restraints 
                  
pp. 294-315

                    1911. Truncated Rule of Reason Inquiry 
                  
pp. 315-340

                    1912. Rule of Reason Treatment for Ancillary Horizontal Restraints 
                  
pp. 341-347

                    1913. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
                  
pp. 348-356

                    1914. Burden and Elements of Proof in Horizontal Restraints Cases 
                  
pp. 3-335
Chapter 20 Horizontal Agreements Limiting Participants' Output
          
pp. 3-7

                2000. Introduction; Preliminary Considerations 
              
pp. 7-12

                2001. Anticompetitive Horizontal Agreement Requires Exclusivity 
              
pp. 13-37

                2002. Basic Cartel Economics 
              
pp. 37-63

                2003. Development of Sherman Act Price-Fixing Law 
              
pp. 65-122
20A Sellers' Joint Limitations on Price or Output
              
pp. 65-70

                    2004. Explicit, "Naked," or Nearly Naked Horizontal Price-Fixing Agreement 
                  
pp. 70-76

                    2005. Price Fixing in Auction Markets: Bid-Rigging, Sale Rotation, Agreement Not to Bid 
                  
pp. 76-80

                    2006. Agreements Setting Market Share or Limiting Output 
                  
pp. 90-91

                    2007. Maximum Price Fixing 
                  
pp. 91-122

                    2008. Restraints in the Learned Professions or Markets Exhibiting Significant Information Asymmetries 
                  
pp. 123-160
20B Price Fixing by Buyers
              
pp. 123-125

                    2010. Introduction 
                  
pp. 125-132

                    2011. Buyers' and Sellers' Naked Cartels Equally Harmful 
                  
pp. 133-142

                    2012. Express Buyers' Cartel Unlawful Per Se 
                  
pp. 142-150

                    2013. Buyers' Agreements Allocating Suppliers, Territories, or Products 
                  
pp. 150-154

                    2014. Product Standardization Agreements Limiting Inputs 
                  
pp. 154-160

                    2015. Special Defenses to Buyer Price Fixing 
                  
pp. 161-209
20C Agreements Fixing Element of Price or Price Determination Process
              
pp. 161-162

                    2020. Introduction; Basic Classification Principles 
                  
pp. 162-168

                    2021. Basic Policy and Economics of Price-Affecting Agreements 
                  
pp. 168-184

                    2022. Agreements Expressly Fixing Price Element 
                  
pp. 184-197

                    2023. Agreements Pertaining to Advertising and Related Dissemination of Product Information 
                  
pp. 197-202

                    2024. Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere 
                  
pp. 202-209

                    2025. Agreements on Terms of Delivery; Agreed Basing-Point Pricing 
                  
pp. 210-236
20D Naked and "Nearly Naked" Market Divisions
              
pp. 210-217

                    2030. Properly Defined Naked Market Divisions Unlawful Per Se 
                  
pp. 217-218

                    2031. Naked Horizontal Market Division: Basic Economics 
                  
pp. 219-224

                    2032. Possible Justifications 
                  
pp. 224-236

                    2033. Distinguishing Horizontal from Vertical Market Divisions: Franchises and Noncompetition Agreements 
                  
pp. 237-335
20E Horizontal Agreements Concerning Rights in Intellectual Property
              
pp. 237-244

                    2040. Introduction 
                  
pp. 244-269

                    2041. Horizontal Price-fixing Provisions in Intellectual Property Licenses 
                  
pp. 269-272

                    2042. Quantity Limitations 
                  
pp. 272-284

                    2043. Cross-Licensing, Patent Pools, and Other Reciprocal Agreements Among Patentees 
                  
pp. 285-306

                    2044. Horizontal Market Divisions Involving Intellectual Property 
                  
pp. 306-307

                    2045. Joint Challenges 
                  
pp. 307-335

                    2046. Settlements Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes 
                  
pp. 3-247
Chapter 21 Horizontal Agreements Facilitating Development, Production, or Distribution
          
pp. 3-47
21A Joint Ventures: Preliminary Issues
              
pp. 3-19

                    2100. Introduction 
                  
pp. 19-22

                    2101. Restraint-of-Trade Standard; Single-Firm Conduct Distinguished 
                  
pp. 22-26

                    2102. Price Impact Lacking or Only Positive; Pleading Requirement; Competitively Harmless Exchanges 
                  
pp. 26-40

                    2103. Significance and Nature of Joint Venture Power Inquiry 
                  
pp. 40-47

                    2104. Significance of Joint Venture Exclusivity 
                  
pp. 47-124
21B Joint Provision of Information and Learning
              
pp. 47-48

                    2110. Introduction 
                  
pp. 48-63

                    2111. Competitor Dissemination and Exchange of Price or Output Information: Benefits and Potential Harms 
                  
pp. 63-84

                    2112. Industrywide Collection and Dissemination of Price and Output Information 
                  
pp. 84-104

                    2113. Direct Competitor Exchange of Price and Related Information 
                  
pp. 104-109

                    2114. Competitor Provision or Exchange of Cost Information 
                  
pp. 109-124

                    2115. Joint Research, Development, or Other Acquisition of Information; Agreements Restraining Innovation 
                  
pp. 124-125
21C Joint Production and Control of Output or Distribution
              
pp. 124-125

                    2120. Overview 
                  
pp. 125-161
21C-1 Production Joint Ventures Generally
                  
pp. 125-130

                        2121. Physical and Legal Attributes 
                      
pp. 130-139

                        2122. Structural Analysis Indicating Antitrust Concern 
                      
pp. 139-161

                        2123. Government Guidelines Pertaining to Joint Ventures 
                      
pp. 161-247
21C-2 Self-Limitations on Joint Venture Output or Competition Among Members
                  
pp. 161-162

                        2130. Introduction; Restraint-of-Trade Standard Recalled 
                      
pp. 162-175

                        2131. Ancillary Output Limitations 
                      
pp. 175-185

                        2132. Market Creation; Joint Price Making 
                      
pp. 185-189

                        2133. Ancillary Maximum Price-Fixing Agreements 
                      
pp. 189-218

                        2134. Market Allocations Ancillary to Joint Production or Distribution; Noncompetition Covenants 
                      
pp. 218-231

                        2135. Joint Purchasing of Inputs, Excluding Advertising 
                      
pp. 231-236

                        2136. Standard Setting as Facilitator of Output Collusion 
                      
pp. 236-247

                        2137. Joint Arrangements for Sales and Distribution 
                      
pp. 247-450
Chapter 22 Horizontal Agreements Excluding Rivals
          
pp. 247-251

                2200. Introduction 
              
pp. 251-285
22A General Issues and Competitive Harms
              
pp. 251-256

                    2201. "Naked" and "Ancillary" Concerted Refusals 
                  
pp. 256-266

                    2202. Anticompetitive Concerted Refusals to Deal: Basic Economics 
                  
pp. 266-276

                    2203. Per Se Illegality for "Naked" Boycott or Concerted Refusal; "Nearly Naked" Refusals 
                  
pp. 276-281

                    2204. Exclusions Directed at Noncompetitors; Purely Vertical Agreements 
                  
pp. 281-284

                    2205. Conspiracy to Exclude or Eliminate Rival by Unfair Practices; Pick-Barth Doctrine 
                  
pp. 285-285
22B Joint Ventures' Expulsion or Refusal to Admit
              
pp. 285-331
22B-1 General and Pervasive Issues
                  
pp. 285-287

                        2210. General Conclusions Summarized 
                      
pp. 287-292

                        2211. Ancillary Concerted Refusal Defined; Power Assessment 
                      
pp. 292-300

                        2212. Relevant "Exclusion" Defined; Exclusion from Market Unnecessary to Competitive Harm 
                      
pp. 300-309

                        2213. Venture Restraints on Members' Activities Outside the Venture 
                      
pp. 309-322

                        2214. Closed or Limited Membership Venture's Duty to Deal 
                      
pp. 322-333

                        2215. Unexplained or Arbitrary Refusals 
                      
pp. 333-401
22B-2 Joint Ventures Subject to Open Membership, Positive Network Externalities, or Significant Scale Economies
                  
pp. 333-351

                        2220. Introduction; Definitions and Basic Competitive Concerns 
                      
pp. 351-382

                        2221. Open Membership Plus Power Creates Expanded Duty; Major Decisions 
                      
pp. 382-384

                        2222. Less Restrictive Alternatives to Open-Membership Venture Exclusion 
                      
pp. 384-398

                        2223. Defenses for Exclusion from Open-Membership Ventures 
                      
pp. 398-401

                        2224. Administration of Access Decrees 
                      
pp. 401-450
22C Joint Making and Enforcement of Product, Industry, or Professional Standards
              
pp. 401-409

                    2230. Introduction 
                  
pp. 409-414

                    2231. Competitive Threat of Exclusion by Standard Setting 
                  
pp. 414-427

                    2232. Minimum Conditions for Competitive Harm 
                  
pp. 427-432

                    2233. Standard Setting in Industries Subject to Significant Network Externalities 
                  
pp. 432-435

                    2234. Special Problems of Standing, Antitrust Injury, and Causation 
                  
pp. 435-450

                    2235. Identifying Unreasonable Standards; Less Restrictive Alternatives 
                  
  pp. -
Part Four: Collateral Antitrust Provisions
      
pp. 3-309
Chapter 23 The Robinson-Patman Act
          
pp. 3-13
23A Introductory Issues
              
pp. 3-4

                    2300. Introduction 
                  
pp. 4-8

                    2301. "Secondary-Line" Injury Essentially Vertical 
                  
pp. 8-13

                    2302. The Robinson-Patman Act: A Brief Historical Overview 
                  
pp. 13-60
23B Technical and "Jurisdictional" Requirements
              
pp. 13-13

                    2310. Introduction 
                  
pp. 13-21

                    2311. Identities and Relationships of the Parties; Remote Purchasers 
                  
pp. 21-31

                    2312. Nature of Qualifying Transactions: High- and Low-Priced "Sales" 
                  
pp. 31-37

                    2313. Reasonably Contemporaneous Transactions; Spot and Long-Term Contracts 
                  
pp. 37-45

                    2314. Sales of "Commodities" 
                  
pp. 45-57

                    2315. Goods of "Like Grade and Quality" 
                  
pp. 57-60

                    2316. Jurisdictional Reach; Goods Bound for Foreign Markets 
                  
pp. 60-78
23C "Discrimination" in Price
              
pp. 60-65

                    2320. Meaning of Price "Discrimination" Under Robinson-Patman Act 
                  
pp. 65-73

                    2321. Discrimination in the Terms of Delivery 
                  
pp. 73-78

                    2322. "Indirect" Price Discriminations; Differential Credit Terms 
                  
pp. 78-79
23D Competitive Injury; Minimizing Conflict with General Antitrust Policy
              
pp. 78-79

                    2330. Introduction 
                  
pp. 79-131
23D-1 Robinson-Patman Act's Theory of Injury
                  
pp. 79-93

                        2331. Statutory Requirement of Competitive Injury 
                      
pp. 93-96

                        2332. Proof of Primary-Line Injury 
                      
pp. 96-126

                        2333. Secondary-Line Injury 
                      
pp. 126-131

                        2334. More Remote Injuries: Third- and Fourth-Line; Customers of Predator or Disfavored Purchaser 
                      
pp. 131-156
23D-2 Competitive Injury: Avoiding Excessive Conflict Between Robinson-Patman and General Antitrust Goals
                  
pp. 131-140

                        2340. Conflicts Between the Robinson-Patman Act and General Antitrust Goals 
                      
pp. 140-141

                        2341. Primary-Line Excesses Greatly Limited by Supreme Court's Brooke Decision 
                      
pp. 141-156

                        2342. Secondary-Line Injury: Minimizing Conflict with General Antitrust Goals and Fidelity to Statutory Language and Legislative History 
                      
pp. 156-221
23E Defenses and Exemptions
              
pp. 156-156

                    2350. Introduction; Overview 
                  
pp. 156-181

                    2351. "Cost Justification" Defense; Quantity Discounts 
                  
pp. 181-206

                    2352. The "Meeting Competition" Defense 
                  
pp. 206-210

                    2353. Changing Conditions 
                  
pp. 210-221

                    2354. Specific Statutory and Nonstatutory Immunities 
                  
pp. 221-285
22F The Robinson-Patman Act's Collateral Liability Provisions
              
pp. 221-221

                    2360. Introduction 
                  
pp. 221-235

                    2361. Buyer Liability Under 2(f) and in Related Circumstances 
                  
pp. 235-258

                    2362. Brokerage Provisions of 2(c) 
                  
pp. 258-284

                    2363. Discrimination in the Provision of Promotional Services or Facilities Under 2(d) and 2(e) 
                  
pp. 284-285

                    2364. Criminal Liability 
                  
pp. 285-309
22G Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
              
pp. 285-287

                    2370. Introduction; Public Enforcement 
                  
pp. 287-306

                    2371. Private Enforcement: Injury-in-Fact, Causation, and Damages 
                  
pp. 306-309

                    2372. Class Actions; Associational Standing as Alternative 
                  
pp. 309-362
Chapter 24 State Antitrust Law: A Brief Introduction
          
pp. 309-325
24A State Antitrust Law in Our Federal System
              
pp. 309-311

                    2400. Introduction; Notice to the Reader 
                  
pp. 311-315

                    2401. Legitimacy of State Antitrust Law Based in History and Federalism 
                  
pp. 315-318

                    2402. Double Jeopardy, Res Judicata, and Federal Limitations on Multiple or Aggregated Recoveries 
                  
pp. 318-325

                    2403. Federal and Self-Imposed Limitations on Reach of State Antitrust Law 
                  
pp. 325-362
24B State Antitrust Law: Coverage and Limitations
              
pp. 325-329

                    2410. Introduction; State Law Coverage Typically Mimics Federal Law 
                  
pp. 329-339

                    2411. Exemptions, Immunities, and Other Limitations on State Antitrust Coverage 
                  
pp. 339-350

                    2412. The State Antitrust System of Remedies 
                  
pp. 350-351

                    2413. Measurement of Market Power 
                  
pp. 351-355

                    2414. Unilateral Exclusionary Conduct: Monopolization, Attempt, and Predatory Pricing 
                  
pp. 355-355

                    2415. State Antitrust Law Merger Policy 
                  
pp. 355-358

                    2416. Agreement and Intraenterprise Conspiracy 
                  
pp. 358-359

                    2417. Vertical Restraints and Agreements 
                  
pp. 359-361

                    2418. Horizontal Agreements and Noncompetition Agreements Involving Potential Rivals 
                  
pp. 361-362

                    2419. Price Discrimination and Related Practices 
                  
  pp. -
Appendices
      
pp. 377-428

            Statutory Appendix 
          
pp. 429-463
Appendix A Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines
          
pp. 465-607
Appendix B Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
          
pp. 509-547
Appendix C Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
          
pp. 549-588
Appendix D Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) (1993)
          
pp. 589-631
Appendix E Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors
          
pp. 635-682

            Addendum: District Court Microsoft Decision